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Complex networks with heterogeneous distribution of loads may undergo a global cascade of overload failures
when highly loaded nodes or edges are removed due to attacks or failures. Since a small attack or failure has the
potential to trigger a global cascade, a fundamental question regards the possible strategies of defense to prevent
the cascade from propagating through the entire network. Here we introduce and investigate a costless strategy
of defense based on a selective further removal of nodes and edges, right after the initial attack or failure. This
intentional removal of network elements is shown to drastically reduce the size of the cascade.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 89.20.Hh, 05.10.-a
The problem of attacks on complex networks [1] has at-
tracted a great deal of attention in recent years [2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
The key factor prompting this research is the observation that
in many growing networks some nodes evolve to become
much more important than others [7, 8]. From a global per-
spective, the important nodes are those whose removal may
either cause the network to fragment or severely limit the com-
munication between the other nodes. A prime paradigm in this
context is that of the scale-free networks (SFNs), which are
characterized by an algebraic distribution of degrees (number
of edges per node) [7]. While robust against random removals
[2, 3, 9], SFNs with realistic scaling exponents [1] are likely
to fragment into small clusters if a critical fraction of most
connected nodes is removed [2, 4, 5]. This happens because
of the significant number of edges removed along with the
highly connected nodes [5].
But in networks where the flow of a physical quantity is im-
portant, such as power grids and computer networks, the frag-
mentation of the network may be triggered by the removal of
one or very few nodes. Indeed, although the removal of few
nodes has little effect on the connectivity of the network, these
removals may trigger a cascade of subsequent failures which
can in turn switch off or disconnect most of the other nodes of
the network, such as in the August 14, 2003 event in the north-
eastern U.S. power transmission network and in recent black-
outs in western Europe. A number of important aspects of
cascading failures in complex networks have been discussed
in the literature, including disturbances in power transmission
systems [10], the origin of rare events [11], the effect of net-
work growth [12], cascades triggered by intentional attacks
[6], avalanche size distributions [13], and congestion insta-
bilities [14] (see also Refs. [15, 16]). In particular, a simple
model of cascades of overload failures has been introduced
[6]. The removal of an even small fraction of highly loaded
nodes (due to either attack or failure) has been shown to trig-
ger global cascades of overload failures in SFNs and other
networks with heterogeneous distribution of loads. This calls
for an investigation on possible strategies of defense to prevent
the cascade from propagating through the entire network.
In this Letter we study a general method to reduce the size
of cascades of overload failures triggered by attacks on or fail-
ures of a small fraction of nodes (hereafter referred to as the
initial attack). One such cascade can be divided in two parts:
(I) the initial attack, whereby a fraction of nodes is removed;
and (II) the propagation of the cascade, where another frac-
tion of nodes is removed due to the subsequent overload fail-
ures. The size of the cascade is measured in terms of the ra-
tio G = N ′/N , where N and N ′ are the initial (before (I))
and final (after (II)) number of nodes in the largest connected
component, respectively. The method of defense introduced
here consists of costless modifications to the network struc-
ture after (I) but before (II). In real networks, (I) and (II) are
separated in time but this time interval is usually much shorter
than the time scale in which the network evolves. Therefore, it
is reasonable to consider that no edge or node can be rewired
or added to the system after the initial attack because any of
these operations would involve extra costs. Accordingly, we
assume that, after the initial attack, the only operations al-
lowed in order to reduce the size of the cascade are the in-
tentional removals of nodes and edges. The expression “in-
tentional removals” (IRs) means removals performed after (I)
and before (II). The trick point here is that these removals in
general reduce even more the final number of nodes in the
largest connected component. We show, however, that the IR
of carefully chosen nodes and edges can in fact constitute an
efficient strategy of defense. Our main result is that the size of
the cascade can be drastically reduced with the IRs of nodes
having small load and edges having large excess of load (to be
defined below). Even though any removal always increases
the immediate damage on the network, the resulting G is in
this case significantly larger (as compared to the case without
defense) because these IRs strongly suppress the propagation
of the cascade.
For concreteness, we consider the model of overload fail-
ures introduced in Ref. [6], which is defined as follows. For a
given network W , we assume that at each time step one unit
of a physical quantity (hereafter called packet) is sent from
node i to node j, for every ordered pair of nodes (i, j) belong-
2ing to the same connected component of W . We assume that
the packet is transmitted along the shortest paths connecting
nodes i and j. If there is more than one shortest path con-
necting two given nodes, the packet is divided evenly at each
branching point. The load Lk on a node k is the total amount
of packets passing through that node per unit of time [17]. Let
Sk denote the connected component of node k and L(i,j)k de-
note the contribution of the ordered pair (i, j) to the load on
k. The load on node k is then [18]
Lk =
∑
i,j
L
(i,j)
k , (1)
where the sum is over all pairs of nodes in Sk. Each node k is
assigned to have a finite capacity Ck . The node operates in a
free-flow regime if Lk ≤ Ck, otherwise the node is assumed
to fail and is removed from the network. Now consider that
W = W(0) is an initially connected network. The initial
load Lk = Lk(0) is given by Eq. (1) with Sk = W(0). The
capacity Ck of node k is assumed [6] to be proportional to the
initial load Lk(0):
Ck = λLk(0), k = 1, 2, ...N, (2)
where λ ≥ 1 is the tolerance parameter and N is the initial
number of nodes in the network. The cascade can be regarded
as a step-by-step process where nodes can be removed at each
time step. We start with W = W(0) at time 0. The condi-
tion λ ≥ 1 guarantees that no node of W(0) is overloaded,
i.e., Lk(0) ≤ Ck ∀k. We assume that an initial attack is per-
formed at time 1, whereby a fraction p of nodes is removed
from W(0) and the resulting network is denoted by W(1).
These removals lead to a global redistribution of loads among
the remaining nodes in the network. The updated load Lk(1)
on a particular node k of W(1) may then become larger than
the capacity Ck . All the overloaded nodes are removed simul-
taneously fromW(1) and the resulting network is denoted by
W(2). This leads to a new redistribution of loads and sub-
sequent overloads may occur. The overloaded nodes are re-
moved and the resulting network is denoted by W(3), and so
on. Let W(n) denote the updated network at time n. This
cascading process stops only when, for a certain n = n′, the
updated load satisfies Lk(n′) ≤ Ck for all the nodes k of
W(n′). The ratio G introduced above as a measure of the size
of the cascade is defined in terms of the number N ′ of nodes
in the largest connected component ofW(n′).
Here we focus on global cascades [i.e., 1−G = O(1)] trig-
gered by initial attacks on a small fraction p of most loaded
nodes. To be specific, we consider a random model of SFNs
[19], where the degree κi ≥ κ0 of each node i is chosen at
random according to the probability distributionP (κ) ∝ κ−γ ,
for a given scaling exponent γ and constant integer κ0. The
degree κi can be regarded as the number of “half edges”
emerging from node i. A network W(0) is then generated
by randomly connecting half edges to form edges, prohibiting
self- and repeated edges [20]. The initial attack and the prop-
agation of the cascade correspond to (I) W(0) → W(1) and
(II) W(1) → W(2) · · · → W(n′), respectively. Our method
of defense consists of an intermediate step W(1) → W(1)
in between (I) and (II), whereby IRs of nodes and/or edges
are performed on W(1). The network W(1) is redefined to
incorporate these removals.
We first consider the IR of nodes. In what follows, all the
quantities refer to the initial network W(0) (unless explicitly
mentioned otherwise) and ‘(0)’ is omitted for simplicity. We
recall that L(i,j)k denotes the contribution of the ordered pair
of nodes (i, j) to the load on node k. The total contribution
of the (unordered) pair i and j to the load on the network is∑
k L
(i,j)
k +
∑
k L
(j,i)
k = 2(Dij+1), whereDij is the shortest
path length between nodes i and j. The factor 2 comes from
the fact that one packet is sent from node i to node j and
another is sent from node j to node i. We consider that half
of this amount is generated by node i while the other half is
generated by node j. Then the total load generated by node i
is
Lgi =
∑
j
(Dij + 1) = (D¯i + 1)(N − 1), (3)
where D¯i is the average shortest path length from node i to all
the others. The average load on each node is L¯ =
∑
i Li/N =∑
i L
g
i /N = (D¯ + 1)(N − 1), where D¯ =
∑
i D¯i/N is the
average shortest path length between any two nodes. Nodes
whose load Li is much larger than Lgi contribute much more
to handling than to generating load. These are the most impor-
tant nodes for the network to operate. The removal of one such
node may cause overloads on a number of other nodes. More
precisely, if a node i is removed from the network, the total
load on the remaining nodes increases by at least the amount
Li − 2L
g
i , unless the removal of node i divides the network
into more than one connected component. Along with the ob-
servation that nodes having large Li tend to have small Lgi
[21], this provides a rationale for attack strategies based on
the removal of highly loaded nodes. On the other hand, nodes
whose load Li is smaller than Lgi generate more load than
they handle. This observation is our starting point to argue
that the size of the cascade can be drastically reduced with
the IR of a certain fraction f of nodes according to any of the
following strategies: (1) nodes with smallest ∆i ≡ Li − Lgi
are removed first; (2) nodes with smallest closeness centrality
D¯−1i are removed first; (3) nodes with smallest load Li are
removed first; (4) nodes with smallest degree κi are removed
first. The IRs are performed on W(1), but for simplicity we
assume that ∆i, D¯i, Li, and κi correspond to the initial values
computed on W(0). In random SFNs, all these quantities are
strongly correlated [21]: the quantities Lgi and Li are nega-
tively correlated, while the quantities ∆i, D¯−1i , Li, and κi are
positively correlated. Therefore we only need to justify one of
the strategies of defense (1)-(4). Consider then strategy (1).
Strategy (1) consists in removing a fraction f of nodes with
most negative ∆i. In order to reduce the size of a cascade
triggered by an initial attack, these IRs have to satisfy two
conditions. The first condition is to reduce the load on the re-
3maining nodes in the network. Because ∆i is negatively cor-
related with D¯i, the removal of nodes with ∆i < 0 tends to
reduce the average shortest path length D¯ between the nodes
that remain connected to the largest component. The average
load L¯ on a node of this component is proportional to both
D¯+1 and the number of other nodes in the same component,
and is therefore reduced with strategy (1). This argument is
based on the initial network W(0) but, for large random net-
works, the same is expected to hold true on W(1) as well.
The second condition is that the fragmentation caused by the
IRs must be smaller than that otherwise caused by the cascade
itself, i.e. G˜ > Go, where G˜ and Go denote the fraction of
nodes remaining in the largest connected component right af-
ter the IRs and after the cascade without defense, respectively.
Because ∆i is positively correlated with the degree κi, the
nodes removed according to strategy (1) tend to be the least
connected nodes in the network. It is well known that most of
the (unremoved) nodes remain in a single connected compo-
nent when any fraction of least connected nodes is removed
[2, 3]. More specifically, G˜ is expected to decrease linearly
as G˜ ≈ 1 − f with the fraction f of nodes removed accord-
ing to strategy (1). (We assume that the fraction p of nodes
removed in the initial attack is small enough so that we can
neglect the contribution of the initial attack to G˜.) Therefore,
the second condition is satisfied even for relatively large f in-
sofar as f < 1−Go. The ratio G for the cascade with defense
is G∗ = G˜ − ∆G˜, where ∆G˜ is due to the propagation of
the cascade. Gathering all these, because G˜ decreases slowly
with increasing f , there should be a certain f < 1 − Go for
which G˜ is large (as compared to Go) and the average load on
the remaining nodes is sufficiently reduced so that the propa-
gation of the cascade is strongly suppressed and ∆G˜ is small.
Therefore strategy (1) is expected to be effective in reducing
the size of global cascades. Because of the correlations men-
tioned above, the same is expected for the strategies (2)-(4).
On the other hand, the network is expected to be sensitive
to the removal of nodes with large ∆i and, due to the correla-
tions [21], to the removal of nodes with large D¯−1i , Li, and κi
as well. All these quantities can be regarded as measures of
centrality. Therefore our first result could be stated as follows:
while the removal of the most central nodes ofW(0) can trig-
ger global cascades, the removal of the least central nodes of
W(1) can drastically reduce the size of these cascades.
Now we present numerical verification of our result con-
cerning the IR of nodes. We consider random SFNs with scal-
ing exponent γ and initial attacks on a small fraction p ≪ 1
of most loaded nodes. Strong evidence for our result is pre-
sented in Fig. 1(a), where we show the ratio G as a function
of the tolerance parameter λ for γ = 3.0 and p = 0.001.
Without defense, this initial attack on only 0.1% of the nodes
triggers global cascades even for relatively large values of the
tolerance parameter λ [Fig. 1(a), stars]. However, the ratio G
is shown to be significantly larger when a suitable fraction of
nodes is intentionally removed according to any of the strate-
gies of defense (1)-(4) [Fig. 1(a), open symbols]. For exam-
ple, for λ = 1.5, we haveG ≈ 0.6 with defense and G ≈ 0.06
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FIG. 1: (a) Ratio G as a function of the tolerance parameter λ. Stars
correspond to attacks without defense, while open circles, squares,
triangles, and diamonds correspond to the IR of nodes according to
the strategies of defense (1)-(4), respectively. (b) Ratio G as a func-
tion of the fraction f of nodes intentionally removed according to
each of the strategies (1)-(4), for λ = 1.5. Solid circles in (a) corre-
spond to the IR of edges for ξ = 2λ. Each curve corresponds to an
average over 20 independent realizations of the network for γ = 3.0,
κ0 = 2, N = 5000, and p = 0.001.
without it. A similar improvement is observed for other values
of the scaling exponent γ. As a function of the fraction f of
IRs, the ratio G displays a well-defined maximum, as shown
in Fig. 1(b) for λ = 1.5. When f is large, the propagation of
the cascade is strongly suppressed and nearly all the damage is
caused by the IRs, i.e.,G is approximately 1−f . This explains
the linear behavior of G for f > 0.4 in Fig. 1(b). When f is
small, most of the damage is caused by the cascade itself. The
maximum of G lies in a region of intermediate f where the
propagation of the cascade is significantly suppressed and the
damage caused by the IRs is relatively small. The results pre-
sented in Fig. 1(a) correspond to this maximum. The almost
perfect agreement between the different strategies of defense
in Figs. 1(a) and 1(b) is due to the strong correlations between
loads, path lengths, and degrees in random SFNs.
We now turn to the IR of edges. We argue that the size of
the cascade can be drastically reduced with the IR of edges
not necessarily connected to the nodes removed in the IR of
nodes. In analogy to the load on nodes, we define the load
Leij on an edge between nodes i and j as the total amount of
packets passing through that edge per unit of time. The load
Li on node i can be expressed in terms of the load on edges
as
Li =
1
2
∑
j∼i
Leij + (Ni − 1), (4)
where the sum is over all the edges directly connected to node
i and Ni is the number of nodes in the corresponding con-
nected component Si. Now consider the network W(1) right
after the initial attack. From Eq. (4), for the load Li(1) on a
node i to be larger than the capacity Ci = λLi(0), the load on
at least one of the edges of node i must exceed the initial load
by a factor larger than λ− 1, i.e., Leij(1) > λLeij(0) for some
edge connected to i. We say that this edge has large excess of
load. The IR of one such edge is expected to reduce the load
on node i (except for exceptional cases where the load on i
4remains unchanged). From this follows that the IR of edges
having large excess of load can be used to reduce the size of
the cascade. However, for these removals to be effective we
need to take into account that the removal of an edge may
cause overloads elsewhere. As a simple strategy that takes
this into account, we propose to remove edges fromW(1) ac-
cording to an auxiliary cascade of overload failures on edges.
This is not to be taken as a real cascade but instead as a cri-
terion to remove edges. Specifically, we consider the follow-
ing: (i) each edge has an imaginary capacity Ceij = ξLeij(0),
where ξ ≥ 1 is a tunable parameter; and (ii) the resulting cas-
cade on edges consists of a step-by-step process where all the
edges satisfying Leij(1) > Ceij are removed simultaneously
from the network andW(1) is redefined at each step to incor-
porate these removals. Note that the cascade on edges, and
hence the IR of edges, takes place after the initial attack (I)
and before the propagation of the cascade on nodes (II). Be-
cause the condition Leij(1) > λLeij(0) is necessary but not
sufficient for node i to be overloaded, we expect this strategy
to be effective for suitable ξ > λ. Without making effort to
optimize the result, in our computations we set ξ = 2λ. The
size of the cascades is significantly reduced with this strategy,
as shown in Fig. 1(a) (solid circles) for random SFNs with
scaling exponent γ = 3.0. For example, for λ = 1.5, the IR
of edges increases G by a factor of 6. The effectiveness of
this strategy for intermediate values of ξ expresses a trade-off
between the suppression of the cascade on nodes (enhanced
for smaller ξ) and the fragmentation of the network due to the
IR of edges (reduced for larger ξ).
In summary, we have introduced a general method to
reduce the size of cascades of overload failures triggered by
attacks on or failures of highly loaded nodes. The method is
based on the IR of nodes and edges before the propagation
of the cascade. We have shown that the size of the cascade
can be drastically reduced with the IR of nodes having small
load and/or edges having large excess of load. Here we have
focused on SFNs and we emphasize that similar results are
expected for other networks with heterogeneous distribution
of loads. In the model considered above the packets are
transmitted along the shortest paths between nodes, but a
heterogeneous distribution of load is also expected for many
models with local routing. Even in a model where the packets
are routed randomly, packets tend to visit highly connected
nodes much more often than other nodes [22]. If, on one
hand, this heterogeneity in the load distribution makes the
system vulnerable to cascading failures, on the other hand, it
makes the removal of poorly loaded nodes and excessively
loaded edges an effective method to reduce the size of the
cascades.
The author thanks Eduardo Gue´ron for illuminating discus-
sions.
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